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on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
Common sense and conventional economic reasoning suggest that liquid sec- 
ondary markets facilitate lower-cost capital formation  than would otherwise 
occur. Broad common sense does not, however, provide a reliable guide to the 
specific market mechanisms-the  nitty-gritty  details  of  market  microstruc- 
ture-that  would produce the most desirable economic outcomes. 
The demand for and supply of liquidity devolves from the willingness, in- 
deed the demand, of  public  investors  to trade.  However,  their demands are 
seldom coordinated except by particular trading mechanisms, causing transient 
fluctuations in the demand for liquidity services and resulting in the fragmenta- 
tion of order flow over time. In most organized secondary markets, designated 
market  makers like dealers and specialists  serve as intermediaries  between 
buyers and sellers who provide liquidity over short time intervals as part of 
their provision of  intermediation  services. Liquidity  may  ultimately be pro- 
vided by the willingness of investors to trade with one another, but designated 
market makers typically bridge  temporal  gaps in investor  demands in most 
markets.' 
Bruce N. Lehmann is professor of economics and finance at the Graduate School of Interna- 
tional Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego. David M. Modest 
is associate professor of finance at the Walter A. Haas School of Business Administration at the 
University of California, Berkeley. 
The authors thank Kazuhisa Okamoto of Wells Fargo Nikko Investment Advisors, Pete Kyle of 
Duke University, and participants at the NBER conference for helpful comments and suggestions. 
They are grateful to Nikko Securities, the Nikko Research Center, and the Institute of Investment 
Technology for providing them with the data and with help in all phases of this investigation. The 
authors have achieved their present level of understanding of Tokyo Stock Exchange mechanisms 
through the patience of Yutaka Fujii, Takeshi Hirano, and Shunzo Kayanuma of the TSE, all of 
whom endured many persistent questions with unfailing good cheer. Tony Azuma and Hiroshi 
Koizumi helped the authors throughout the project, both by  inquiring about the TSE mechanisms 
and by performing the calculations. The authors remain guilty of any remaining errors. 
1. The former is commonly termed natural liquidity and the latter bridge liquidity. 
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This is not the case on one of the largest and most active stock markets in 
the world: the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). The designated intermediaries of 
the TSE are merely  order clerks called saitori.’  The saitori clerks log limit 
orders in a public limit order book and match incoming market orders to the 
limit orders or to each other in accordance  with  strict rules based on price, 
time, and size priority. On the TSE, orders from the investor public, not from 
designated market makers, bridge temporal fluctuations in the demand for li- 
quidity services. 
All continuous market mechanisms cope with temporary order imbalances 
that outstrip their capacity to supply liquidity, essentially by throwing sand in 
the gears. Since no designated market maker stands ready to absorb transient 
order flow variation on the TSE, its procedures  provide for flagging possible 
occurrences  of  transient order imbalances  and for routinely  halting  trade to 
attract orders when particular kinds of order imbalances occur. Such mecha- 
nisms always trade the benefits of attracting more liquidity to the marketplace 
against the cost of  impeding the price discovery process  and the immediacy 
of execution. 
The Securities  and Exchange  Commission  (SEC  1992) noted that  it pro- 
posed the addition of  a consolidated limit order book to the National Market 
System (NMS) in 1976. It went on to record that “commentators  [like the ex- 
changes] asserted that a time and price preference for public limit orders would 
provide a major trading advantage for those orders, thereby creating a disincen- 
tive for the commitment of market making capital by dealers, and might even- 
tually force all trading into a fully automated trading system” (3). By contrast, 
many  academics  and practitioners  believe that  market structures  should re- 
semble such consolidated public limit order books because they produce low- 
cost liquidity, essentially by providing open and equal access to market mak- 
ing. The TSE has many of  these features, making it an interesting subject for 
a comparative study. 
Financial economists, practitioners, and regulators are at present evaluating 
the relative fairness and efficiency of alternative market structures.i An empiri- 
cal appraisal of the TSE’s mechanisms would appear to be a useful contribution 
at this time. In this paper, we study the procedures  designed  to warn of and 
cope with transient order imbalances and their impact on the price discovery 
process.d 
2. The order book officials (OBOs) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange play a similar role 
3.  The Market 2000 study is one major focus of this effort. 
4.  We  also devote a little attention to the division of the trading day into two trading sessions 
and the large tick sizes for some stocks. We ignore two important frictions: fixed commissions and 
the stamp tax. Commissions are sizable, just below  1 percent for one to five round lots and some- 
what above 0.5 percent for ten to thirty round lots of a stock selling for Y1,OOO.  The stamp tax is 
0.30 percent for customers and 0.12 percent for member firms. In  so doing, we take the order 
placement strategies of  investors as given and measure their impact given the constraints imposed 
by the market mechanism. 
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The paper is laid out as follows. Section 9.1 describes the market-making 
mechanism, and section 9.2 provides an analytical description of the data. Sec- 
tion 9.3 reports on the efficacy of the TSE trading mechanisms. A brief conclu- 
sion rounds out the paper. 
9.1  An Analytic Description of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
In this section, we first contrast the salient qualities of the TSE with those 
of exchanges in the United States like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
We  then describe the structure of  the market and its trading mechanisms in 
some detaiL5 
9.1.1  Fragmentation and Transparency in U.S. and Japanese Equity Markets 
One useful way  to contrast equity trading mechanisms is in terms of frag- 
mentation  and  transparency.  Fragmentation  has  two  dimensions:  time  and 
space. We discussed temporal fragmentation in the introduction-the  unex- 
pected variation in order flow over time. Spatial fragmentation refers to com- 
peting market mechanisms that might differ in trading opportunities, partici- 
pants,  or the method  of  participation.  Transparency  refers to the extent  to 
which the information disseminated by a trading venue provides a clear ex ante 
picture of trading opportunities and a clear ex post picture of comparative trad- 
ing performance. In order to contrast trading mechanisms in these dimensions, 
we must examine the particulars of order submission, exposure, execution, and 
reporting as well as those of competing mechanisms in the same securities. 
Like the TSE, the NYSE is an order-driven market. However, it is notpurely 
order-driven:  specialists act both as designated intermediaries  and as desig- 
nated market makers who often supply liquidity when public orders are not 
available. Like the saitori, the specialist logs limit orders and either crosses 
incoming market orders, exposes them to the crowd, or marries them to public 
limit orders when possible. When order imbalances remain, specialists gener- 
ally first fill any such orders out of inventory. If order imbalances are unusually 
large, the specialist can temporarily halt trading with the approval of a floor 
official of the NYSE.6 
The TSE mechanism presupposes that order imbalances might be transient 
or might  signal the discovery  of a new  “equilibrium” price. Accordingly, it 
advertises the presence of imbalances through indicative quote dissemination 
and temporarily halts trade to expose pending orders to the public when the 
immediate execution  of one or more orders would move prices “too much.” 
5. The basic structure of the TSE has been described well by  others, including Amihud and 
Mendelson (1989), Lindsey and Schaede (l992), Hamao and Hasbrouck (1993), and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (1989). 
6. See Hasbrouck, Sofianos, and Sosebee (1993) for a recent detailed discussion of  NYSE halt 
procedures. The TSE has similar provisions for halting trade when news has been released or is 
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Finding out whether such mechanisms are efficacious is one major motivation 
for this paper. 
Spatial fragmentation is an important feature of equity trading in the United 
States. Numerous trading venues now provide different investors with different 
kinds  of  trading  opportunities.  Specialized venues  exist  for  trading  large 
blocks of stock on the upstairs market of the NYSE and for small retail orders 
through order flow purchases by  third-market dealers like Madoff Securities. 
Several regional  markets compete for order flow as third-market  dealers by 
guaranteeing  execution at or inside the NYSE spread. Several fourth-market 
mechanisms compete with the NYSE by letting institutions trade directly with 
one another without the intermediation services of an organized market or mar- 
ket makers. Examples include public  single-price  auctions  like the Arizona 
Stock Exchange  and crossing  networks  that  use  different  NYSE prices  or 
quotes during hours when the NYSE is open, like Posit and Instinet, or when 
it is closed, like Reuters' Crossing network.' 
The TSE differs in this dimension as well. The vast majority of trading in 
equities listed on the TSE takes place on its physical or its electronic trading 
floor. Slightly fewer than one thousand stocks listed on the TSE are listed on 
regional exchanges in Japan, but volume off the TSE is small, and these ex- 
changes cannot engage in third-market-style  competition  because  they have 
very similar trading structures.8 There is no separate structure for large and 
small, retail and institutional, or any other differentiation of order by  size of 
trade, type of  investor, or form of trading venue. The TSE is the largest highly 
consolidated equity trading mechanism in the world.9 
Securities markets also differ in their levels of transparency. U.S. auction 
markets like the NYSE have routine trade reporting and dissemination proce- 
dures to ensure that trading results are broadcast widely. The TSE audit and 
reporting procedures resemble those of American exchanges; hence, the TSE 
differs little in ex post transparency.") As for ex ante transparency, American 
7. Whether such fragmentation impairs liquidity and the process of price discovery or improves 
performance through competition rcmains an open question. Many of  the underlying issues are 
complicated, including violation of price, size, and time priority across markets and the anonymity 
of trading on many trading venues. 
8. The regional exchanges have nearly identical order-driven limit order books maintained by 
order clerks who do not act as market makers. Osaka is the largest regional exchange by far, largely 
because of its active index futures and options markets. The others are Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Ky- 
oto, Nagoya, Niigata, and Sapporo. 
9. Other markets with comparable levels of  automation like the Toronto Stock Exchange and 
the Paris Bourse have separate block trading facilities. The TSE does have a limited public block 
trading facility, which accounts for only a small fraction of trading. See section 9. I  .2. 
10. Major differences in ex post transparency exist between order-driven markets like the NYSE 
and the TSE and dealer markets like the Stock Exchange Automated Quotations (SEAQ) system 
in London, which does not enforce last-sale reporting. Ex post transparency is a public good, and 
the property rights to the information that a trade has occurred (and any associated informational 
externalities) are assigned to the trader in many dealer markets, including SEAQ. Traders seem to 
value anonymity-much  of  the volume of  the Madrid Stock Exchange and Paris Bourse (both 
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exchanges and the TSE both widely disseminate the best bid and offer in a 
stock. However, the TSE is less transparent than its American counterparts in 
the dissemination  of  quote depth, which  is broadcast  widely  in the United 
States but not in Japan.” 
However, the TSE provides for high levels of transparency in the head of- 
fices of  its member firms.  Every  member has a small number  of  terminals 
(based loosely on annual trading volume) on which the consolidated limit or- 
der book of any listed stock can be viewed at any time. It lists the extant bids 
and offers and their aggregate size at each price, but this information can be 
neither stored nor rebroadcast. All traders can supply liquidity in the face of 
fragmentation of trades over time, since the TSE routinely flags potential order 
imbalances.  However, only head-office traders of member firms (and others 
who talk to them) have this special access to the limit order book, and head- 
office brokers can and do routinely examine the limit order book when buying 
or selling stock for customers, particularly for large institutions. 
To some extent, then, we can think of the TSE mechanism as approximating 
the information content of a consolidated electronic limit order book, at least 
from the viewpoint of  member firms.’*  In addition, the TSE mechanism adver- 
tises both potential order imbalances and temporary trading halts through the 
dissemination  of  indicative quotes as discussed below. Taken together, these 
features may be a close substitute for widespread  dissemination  of the elec- 
tronic book.I3 
9.1.2  The Structure of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
There are 1,661 stocks listed on the TSE. Of these, 1,232  are in the so-called 
First Section, and 429 less active stocks are in the Second Section. The 151 
most active First Section stocks are still traded on the trading fl00r.I~  The re- 
maining First Section and all of the Second Section stocks are traded electroni- 
11. The information content of  quote depth in the United States is not clear, since quotes are 
often only for nominal sizes. Member firms can broadcast the best bid and offer to their branches, 
but not all firms do so. Outside investors can generally get only more limited data like the high, 
low, open, and closing prices as well as the five most recent trade prices directly from vendors like 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei). 
12. The conditional statement “to some extent” is critical here-a  whole host of agency prob- 
lems are associated with interpreting broker-dealer observation of  the limit order book as close to 
widespread dissemination of  and open access to the book. This interpretation would surely be 
questioned by  academics like Glosten (1994) and Black (1993) and practitioners,  particularly 
fourth-market advocates like Steve Wunsch and the Arizona Stock Exchange. 
13. Prior to the electronic book, the saitori would provide ready access to the limit order book 
to all trading clerks on the floor. While it is perhaps easy to understand why the TSE does not 
widely disseminate the electronic limit order book, the restriction of the number of screens at the 
head office is harder to understand. The TSE apparently views the current system as facilitating 
order processing and execution only and that widespread dissemination would facilitate market 
making by member firms, an undesirable outcome from the TSE’s viewpoint. 
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cally  on  the  Computer-Assisted  Order  Routing  and  Execution  System 
(CORES).'5 
The trading rules for floor- and system-traded stocks are identical. Orders 
for less than three thousand shares for floor-traded stocks are usually submitted 
electronically, while larger orders are brought to saitori posts manually.lh Order 
entry is electronic for system-traded stocks. There is no odd-lot trading, and 
one thousand shares is a round lot for most stocks." 
The TSE has two trading sessions per day. The morning session begins at 
9:OO  A.M.  and ends at 11:OO  A.M. Trading resumes at 12:30 P.M. and ends at 
3:OO  P.M.  Most  continuous  trading  markets  begin  trading  sessions  with  a 
single-price auction. The TSE is no exception, starting each session with an auc- 
tion called the itayose. Continuous trading follows until the close of the session. 
The itayose is based on standard auction market principles. Public market 
and limit orders are submitted in the twenty-five minutes before the open. The 
saitori clerks essentially search for a price that executes all market-on-open 
orders and roughly matches the residual supplies and demands expressed as 
limit orders.I8 The itayose is also used to reopen trade after a suspension by 
the president of the TSE. 
Failure to meet these conditions results in a delayed open. In the event of a 
delayed open, the saitori issues a special quote (the tokubetsu kehai, described 
extensively below).19 Briefly, the purpose of this indicative quote is to attract 
sufficient  orders  from the  public  until  the  conditions  required  to  open  the 
stocks are met. The special quote adjustment process used in delayed opens is 
identical to the one described below (which is used in the continuous market), 
except that the saitori cumulates orders until the itayose requirements are met. 
The TSE also permits market-on-close orders to be executed in a batch auc- 
tion. For such auctions, the requirement that at least one round lot of each limit 
15. CORES is based on the Computer Assisted Trading System (CATS) of  the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (a different TSE) but is operated somewhat differently. For example, the Toronto Stock 
Exchange has designated market makers. 
16. These orders arrive via the Floor Order Routing and Execution System (FORES). 
17. A round lot is one thousand shares for a stock with a par value of V50  and one hundred 
shares for the small number of stocks with a par value of 8500 and for selected high-priced stocks. 
About one hundred securities fall into this latter category. Odd lots are traded off the exchange, 
but round lots must be traded on an exchange. 
18. In order to open a stock, the saitori must execute (1) all market orders, (2) at least one limit 
order, (3) all limit orders that better the itayose price, (4)  all limit orders on one side of the market 
at the itayose price, and (5) at least one round lot of  each limit order on the other side of the market 
at the itayose price. Amihud and Mendelson (1989). Hasbrouck, Sofianos, and Sosebee (1993),  and 
Lindsey and Schaede (1992)  provide examples of the opening process. One difference between the 
TSE and the NYSE is that the specialist may participate in the open, but there is no designated 
market maker available to do so on the TSE. The requirement that a limit order participates in the 
TSE open replaces the possibility of specialist participation in the NYSE open. 
19. The initial special quote is set equal to the prior close plus or minus the maximum price 
variation (see table 9.  I) in the direction of the order imbalance. The initial order imbalance at that 
price is calculated from the demand and supply curves based on the market and limit orders sub- 
mitted prior to the itayose. This order imbalance is reported as the size of  the special quote on 
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order on one side of the market must be executed at the itayose price is weak- 
ened. It is often difficult to execute market-on-close orders using this revised 
itayose mechanism because prices that would clear the market often exceed the 
maximum price variation between trades, and so such orders often go unexe- 
cuted.  As a consequence, market-on-close orders are used much less frequently 
in Tokyo than in the United States.20 
Following the itayose, the continuous auction market called the zaraba be- 
gins operation. The best unexecuted limit orders become the opening bid and 
offer. Limit orders remain on the book until they are executed or canceled or 
until the afternoon session ends. After the open, the saitori maintains the limit 
order book and marries  incoming market orders with either limit orders or 
other incoming market orders.21  This process continues until a temporary trad- 
ing halt results from an order imbalance, the trading session ends, the president 
of the exchange suspends trading, or the daily price limit is hit. The latter two 
possibilities are extremely rare. 
Virtually all trades are executed during the itayose and the zaraba. There is 
a very limited block trading facility and an unusual method for crossing trades. 
There are electronic bulletin boards on the floor on which member firms can 
publicly advertise large orders to potential counterparties. This limited form of 
sunshine trading essentially constitutes the public block trading mechanism of 
the TSE.Z2  Crossing trades can occur only if the same member firm represents 
both sides of the trade.23  Virtually all crossing trades are made with a corporate 
equity holder being both the buyer and the seller, and the member firm  essen- 
tially serves as a dealer to facilitate the trade. The purpose of these trades is to 
change the book value of an equity position owned by that corporation on its 
balance sheet at fiscal year end.24 
20. The TSE says there is relatively little demand for this service, an unsurprising outcome 
given the difficulties with the mechanism. 
21. Saitori clerks also monitor the limit order book and control the execution process for system- 
traded stocks. 
22. These advertisements are posted on the display above the trading floor and are not broadcast, 
although the floor brokers of member firms rapidly transmit this information to their home offices. 
Their use is sufficiently rare that all successful trades result in loud and widespread applause on 
the trading floor. 
23. Strictly speaking, one customer cannot be both buyer and seller in the same transaction 
because of the portion of the Securities and Exchange Law that defines manipulative activity to be 
trading without an intent to transfer possession. Consequently, the member firm acts like a dealer 
and essentially executes two trades when crossing on the TSE. Since these trades must go through 
the limit order book, the member firm cannot cross the trade at the single market price if there are 
other orders on the book. Accordingly, member firms frequently cross trades on regional exchanges 
since their limit order books are often empty because most trading is consolidated on the TSE. In 
order to forestall manipulation (such as the illegal trading done in 1990 and 1991 to compensate 
customers for losses they  incurred), large transactions in which one member firm acts as both 
buyer and seller must be executed at a price within a fixed limit of the last trade price on the TSE, 
irrespective of where the trade is executed. In addition, the member firm must report the purpose 
of the trade and the kind of customer to the exchange. 
24. Lindsey and Schaede (1992) discuss the private crossings called onna-hen no baikai. Baikai 
do not pass through the saitori's order book but instead are treated as if they are matched by  the 282  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
Trading during the day is subject to a variety of price limits that are given in 
table 9.1. The maximum price variation and the daily price limit are both upper 
bounds on price changes. The daily price limit is the maximum amount that a 
price can change on a trading day relative to the closing price on the prior day. 
Trade is suspended whenever the daily price limits are hit, but trade can resume 
again by  the submission of limit orders at admissible prices. These limits are 
wide; hence, trading is rarely suspended because of them. The maximum price 
variation describes the maximum price change from the previous trade that a 
single order is permitted  to cause by  executing it against limit orders on the 
book. Much of this paper is devoted to an analysis of  the role played by  the 
maximum price variation. 
A neglected  institutional  feature of  the TSE is the tick  size or minimum 
price variation of stocks.zs In U.S. markets, the tick size is usually fixed at an 
eighth, although traders can split ticks in some circumstances. In contrast, tick 
sizes on the TSE depend on stock prices, as shown in table 9.1. A particularly 
interesting break point occurs at Y1,OOo: a Yl minimum tick for stocks selling 
below Y1,OOO and a Y10 minimum tick for stocks selling above Y1,000.2h  Since 
roughly one-third of  the stocks on the TSE sell for more than Yl,OOO,  the tick 
size is nearly  1 percent for many stocks, making stepping across the spread to 
buy immediacy quite expensive.*’ 
9.1.3  Order Imbalances and the Trading Mechanisms of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange 
The TSE needs a mechanism to deal with temporary order imbalances be- 
cause no designated  market maker stands ready to meet fluctuations in the 
demand for liquidity. There are three components of the TSE system for coping 
with potential order imbalances:  (1) advertising the possibility of a transient 
order imbalance; (2) halting  trade  when  immediate execution  of  one order 
would move prices “too much”; and (3) providing for orderly quote changes 
on the path to a new “equilibrium” price when an order imbalance is created 
by more than one order. We devote the rest of this section to a comprehensive 
customers themselves, with the member firm acting as consultant and certifying that the trade was 
consummated within exchange rules. Neither member firms nor their subsidiaries can be a buyer 
or seller in buikui. The price setting and reporting requirements resemble those for regular cross- 
ing trades. 
25.  Angel (1993) also notes the extreme tick-size change in percentage terms at Y1.000. 
26. Few stocks sell above Y10.000 and only Nippon Telephone  and Telegraph  sells for more 
than Y30.000. 
27. We account for tick-size effects in much of our work by sorting stocks into price categories. 
We report  in passing that we have observed the standard trade-off  between tick size and market 
depth. For example, average trade size is much larger in stocks with large tick sizes, reflecting the 
greater protection from informed traders  afforded  by  larger spreads. See Lehmann and Modest 
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Table 9.1  Tick Size, Maximum Price Variation, and Daily Price Limits on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Maximum Price 
Price Range  Tick Size  Variation  Daily Price Limit 
0 <  YlOO 
YlOl toY200 
Y20  1 to Y500 
Y501 toY1,000 
Y1,OOl toY1,500 
Y1,501  to Y2.000 
Y2,001 to Y3.000 
Y3,OOl to Y5.000 
Y5,OOl toY10,OOO 































Source:  Tokyo Stock Exchange, International Affairs Department, Tokyo Stock  Exchange Fact 
Book 1994. 
description  of these procedures:  the chui and tokubetsu kehai (warning and 
special quote) mechanisms.z8 
Figure 9.1 describes the possible chain of events following the arrival of  a 
market  order. There are numerous eventualities given in figure 9.1, but the 
main possibilities are numbered  (1) a regular trade occurs; (2)  trading occurs 
at several prices at which warning quotes (chui kehai) are generally issued (i.e., 
the order walks up or down the book), but no trading halt occurs; (3) a warning 
quote trading halt occurs since the maximum price variation is exceeded; and 
(4) a special quote (tokubetsu kehai) trading halt occurs because another order 
arrived on the same side of the market as the pending order. The latter three 
possibilities are what we mean by advertising a potential imbalance, halting a 
trade because of one large order, and providing for discovery of a new “equilib- 
rium” price when a trading halt is caused by more than one large order. Note 
that it is usually possible to determine from the regular quotation screen which 
of these eventualities transpired. 
When a market order arrives at the TSE, the basic initial outcomes are no 
trade and a regular trade. Two points of reference govern execution: the best 
limit orders on the book and the base price (i.e., the price of  the most recent 
transaction). A regular trade occurs if all or part of the order can be filled at 
the current  bid or offer.29 No trade occurs if  (1) the difference between  the 
best quote and the prior day’s closing price exceeds the daily price limit, an 
28. Lindsey and Schaede (I  992) describe the tokubetsu kehai mechanism in some detail. Hamao 
and Hasbrouck (1993)  provide the most detailed account of both mechanisms we  have seen, but 
the example they give of warning quote behavior in their table  I  seems incorrect. 
29. The saitori could even issue a warning quote and halt trade if prices change only by bouncing 
between the bid and offer inside the maximum price variation bounds. 284  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
Fig. 9.1  Possible events following the arrival of a market order 
uncommon event due to the price limits shown in table 9.1; or (2)  there is no 
quote available or the difference between the base price and the available quote 
exceeds the maximum price variation, in which case the saitori issues a warn- 
ing quote at the base price (or one tick above or below it). 
The warning quote process generally follows a regular trade in two circum- 
stances. The first case arises if the size of the market order exceeds the depth 
at the quote so that continued execution of the order would cause the price to 
change from the base price. The second case occurs if there is no quote avail- 
able (that is, either there is no limit order on the books or one that, if executed, 
would cause the maximum variation to be exceeded). In both cases, the normal 
quotation screen indicates that a warning quote is pending, so that this informa- 
tion is widely available. Note that warning quotes do not give the size of the 
pending 
30. The size of the pending order is displayed on the electronic limit order book. 285  Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Figure 9.2 traces the sequence of events following the issuance of a warning 
quote. It is useful to distinguish two cases: either there are or are not limit 
orders on the book large enough to fill the rest of the pending order without 
exceeding the  maximum  price variation. All or part  of  the pending order is 
usually executed at different prices against limit orders on the book if the maxi- 
mum price variation is not exceeded. In this case, warning quotes are generally 
issued as each new price is hit, as a sequence of trades and warning quotes 
appears on the normal quotation screen. The word “generally” covers two ex- 
ceptions: the saitori may exercise his discretion (I)  to execute such trades with- 
out issuing warning quotes or (2)  to delay execution. Nevertheless, the saitori 
usually permits semiautomatic execution and warning quote issuance within 
the maximum price variation limits.” 
There are two primary ways in which the nonhalt  portion of  the warning 
quote process usually ends. The pending order is either completely or only 
partially  filled.  If  the  pending  order  is completely  filled,  the base  price  is 
changed to the last execution price, and the trading screen will register a return 
to normal quotes. If it is only partially filled, a warning quote is issued at the 
limit  set by  the  maximum  price  variation,  and trade  is temporarily  halted. 
There is no formal announcement of a temporary halt; the warning quote just 
sits on the normal quotation screen without being altered. Hence, this occur- 
rence can be discerned by many market participants. 
There are other, less likely outcomes. An opposing order might arrive, trig- 
gering a normal conclusion of the warning quote process; an order from an- 
other member firm on the same side of  the market might arrive, triggering a 
special quote; the pending order might be canceled, triggering a return to nor- 
mal quotes; or the trading session might end. These possibilities are much less 
likely because the saitori usually concludes the nonhalt portion of the warning 
quote process quickly. 
If trade is halted, all or part of the pending order is available at the warning 
quote. The saitori rarely changes a warning quote at the maximum price varia- 
tion  limit without  the arrival  of  additional orders.  Put differently,  the  TSE 
mechanism implicitly assumes that one order that may move prices  substan- 
tially might well signify only a temporary order imbalance. Accordingly, the 
warning quote mechanism stops the price discovery process when the maxi- 
mum price variation limit is reached, inviting potential counterparties to hit the 
warning quote. 
Consequently,  large orders have  something  of  sunshine flavor. Since the 
limit order book can be viewed at the head office of  a member firm, traders 
placing  large orders are likely to look at it beforehand. Submitting an order 
large enough to cause a warning quote trading halt guarantees partial execution 
31. As is evident in the results given below, saitori clerks do not issue warning quotes in these 
circumstances a nontrivial fraction of the time. The word “semiautomatic” means that saitori clerks 
choose to do so most of the time, not that this procedure is programmed into CORES. 286  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
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Fig. 9.2  Warning quote behavior prior to reaching maximum price variation 
of the order at predetermined  prices and effectively holds an auction for any 
part of the remainder. 
Figure 9.3 delimits the ways in which warning quote trading halts can end. 
The auction of the pending order concludes successfully if an opposing order 
arrives. All or part of  the pending order is then filled, the base price changes, 
and the quotation screen returns to normal quotes. Any unfilled portion of ei- 
ther the pending market order or the opposing order if it was a market order is 
then treated  as though  it were  a new market order, and the process  begins 
anew.32  The market returns to normal quotes if the pending order is canceled, 
and the pending order is suspended if the trading session ends.33 
Finally, the warning quote is converted into the other indicative quote-the 
special quote or tokubetsu kehai-if  a market order arrives from another mem- 
ber firm on the same side of the market as the pending order. The issuance of 
a special quote is also widely disseminated on the regular quotation screen. As 
with the warning quote, a special quote can end if an opposing order arrives, 
the pending orders are canceled, or the trading session ends. 
However,  the mechanism provides for gradual quote adjustment  past the 
32. Note that a partial fill of the pending order still results in a return to normal quotes. The 
TSE mechanism presumes that the warning quote is a reasonable candidate for the "equilibrium 
price" if someone is willing to trade at that price, not requiring that trader to fill the entire pending 
order at that price. 
33. The pending order is canceled if the afternoon session ends, and the last transaction price 
becomes the base pnce for the purpose of computing the daily price limit for the next day. The 
order becomes part of the afternoon itayose if it is pending at the conclusion of the morning session 
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Fig. 9.3  Warning quote trading halts 
Fig. 9.4  Special quote trading halts 
limit set by the maximum price variation even if no additional orders arrive. 
Put differently, the TSE special quote mechanism implicitly assumes that mo 
orders on the same side of the market that might move prices substantially may 
well signal a change in the equilibrium price. Accordingly, the special quote 
mechanism permits the price discovery process to continue without the arrival 
of opposing orders. 
Figure 9.4 describes this process. In the absence of opposing orders, the 
norm is to revise the special quote every five minutes, although the saitori may 
choose to revise it less frequently. The saitori seldom permits pending orders 
to be canceled and logs additional orders on the same side of the market for 
possible execution on the basis of time priority.34  If the market remains quies- 
cent, the saitori revises the special quote until the pending orders are eventually 
executed against the best limit order on the book-termed  the stale limit order 
34. There are informal rules that virtually prohibit pending-order cancellation. For example, 
special quote trading halts ended with order cancellation in fewer than 0.25 percent of the observa- 
tions (7 out of 2,893) in our twenty-six-month sample. 288  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
in figure 9.4-if  there is  An exception occurs when special quote revi- 
sion would penetrate the daily price limit barrier, in which case trading is SUS- 
pended pending the arrival of  an order that can be executed inside the daily 
price limit. 
Otherwise, a special quote trading halt ends in the same ways as a warning 
quote trading halt. If an opposing order arrives, all or part of the pending orders 
are filled, the base price changes, and the quotation screen returns to normal 
quotes. Any unfilled portion of either the pending orders or the opposing order, 
if it was a market order, is then treated as if it were a new market order, and 
the process begins anew.36  The market returns to normal quotes if the pending 
orders are canceled, and the pending orders are suspended if the trading ses- 
sion ends.” 
As noted earlier, the TSE does not widely  disseminate information about 
trading opportunities beyond the current best bid and offer to most participants. 
Instead, it disseminates two indicative quotes when market conditions suggest 
either an order imbalance or a change in the equilibrium price: the warning 
quote (chui kehai) and the special quote (tokubetsu kehai). The saitori tempo- 
rarily halts trade if continued execution of a single order would cause the price 
change to exceed the maximum price variation relative to the initial base price. 
A warning quote is converted to a special quote if an order from another mem- 
ber firm  arrives on the same side of the market as the order that generated the 
warning quote. If no opposing orders arrive, the special quote is gradually re- 
vised until a new price is established by a completed transaction, which may 
be only a partial fill. 
Finally, these procedures may not impede the trading process too much for 
two reasons. First, the maximum price variation bands for most stocks are be- 
tween  1 and 2 percent. Second, both  chui and tokubetsu  kehai trading halts 
end if an opposing order only partially fills any pending orders, even an order 
for only one round lot. Accordingly, prices can move substantially on relatively 
small volume despite these limitations on trading. 
9.2  The TSE Data and Some Limitations on What Can Be Learned 
from It 
Our data were compiled by the TSE and provided to us by Nikko Securities. 
We have twenty-six months of data: January 1, 1991, through November 30, 
35. Note that the stale limit order can be canceled by  the order submitter any time during the 
warning and special quote process until it is executed. Once again, the stale limit order need not 
completely fill the pending orders. 
36. Execution of the pending orders proceeds according to time and size priority. Once again, 
the opposing order need not completely fill the pending orders. 
37. In contrast with warning quotes, the prevailing special quote becomes the base price for the 
purpose of  computing the daily price limit for the next day if a special quote is pending at the 
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1991, and February 1, 1992, through April 30, 1993.38  We have records of all 
(25,863,725) completed transactions on all TSE stocks and all quotes (includ- 
ing indicative quotes) for all system-traded stocks. We confine our attention to 
stocks traded on CORES since we are interested in quote behavior. We also 
limit our investigation to First Section stocks on the TSE, since Second Section 
stocks are much less actively traded, and, hence, the market for liquidity  in 
these stocks is likely to differ substantially from that of the more active First 
Section stocks. 
Our data on system-traded stocks are those that are widely available to mar- 
ket participants from member firms-that  is, the data are in their broadcast 
form. Each record gives the best bid and offer if available, an indication of 
whether either quote was a warning or special quote, the trade size if a transac- 
tion took place, and a time stamp that records the time to the nearest minute.39 
Buy and sell transactions are easily distinguished-virtually  all trades take 
place at either the bid or offer. 
From these data, we identified all trades that generated warning quotes. We 
consolidated  these  data  into warning  and  special  quote  events-trade  and 
quote sequences that can show how these mechanisms work in actual practice 
from the time a large order triggered indicative quote dissemination to the time 
of  the  return  to normal  quotes.  We  identified  722,217  such events  in  our 
twenty-six-month sample, an average of slightly less than 1.25 times per stock 
per day. 
This procedure omits a large class of similar events-those  in which saitori 
clerks permit a large trade to walk up or down the limit order book without 
issuing a warning quote. We call these regular multiple price change events 
because they appear as regular trades at different prices on the transaction re- 
cord. Accordingly, we searched for sequences of trades satisfying three crite- 
ria: all trades in the sequence were executed within the same minute at a mono- 
tone sequence of different prices on the same side of the market. We identified 
154,582 such events that proved to be virtually  identical to non-trading  halt 
warning quote events in all details save for the lack of warning quote issu- 
an~e.~O  Such events occur at an average rate of  roughly 0.25 times per stock 
per day, making the overall occurrence of multiple price change events roughly 
1.5 times per stock per day. 
We are like most public investors-we  do not have access to the limit order 
38. The data for December 1991 and January 1992 were inexplicably lost. 
39. Trades are time-stamped to the nearest second internally, but the broadcast data have this 
coarser time stamp, making it hard to detect violations of time priority. The codes are 80 for a 
regular quote, 81 for a warning quote, 20 for a special quote, and 00 for no quote. The no-quote 
indicator implies that either there is no quote available or that any available quote is very far from 
the executable range. 
40. For example, the saitori clerks let prices exceed the maximum price variation limit in 1.83 
percent (13,208 out of 722,217) non-trading  halt warning quote events. In regular multiple price 
change events, the saitori clerks permitted this limit to be exceeded in only 0.39 percent (601 out 
of  154,582) of the regular events in our twenty-six-month sample. 290  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
book-and  this  limits what  we can learn. We  can only learn  reduced-form 
facts  from  completed  transactions,  not  structural  observations  on  order- 
placement strategies and the supply of  liquidity. Large orders may be placed 
only when the book indicates the market can absorb them, and small ones may 
be larger orders that are broken up. This observation has particular force here 
because we know that orders are systematically broken up and executed over 
time on the TSE, due to the absence of separate markets for large and small 
 trade^.^' 
One cannot be  much  more certain about the  interpretation  of completed 
transactions  that  end  chui  and  tokubetsu  kehai  trading  halts.  Traders  at 
member-firm head offices who end halts by hitting the warning or special quote 
know the pending order size(s) if they first consult the electronic limit order 
book.42  Their order-placement strategies presumably  take this possibility into 
account. For example, suppose that such traders are risk neutral and that they 
play ~ompetitively.~'  Then the order size they choose-the  size of  the com- 
pleted transaction-is  set so that the warning or special quote is the expected 
value of the asset, given current information and the size of the pending order. 
One cannot simply assume that the warning or special quote measures the per- 
ceived marginal value of the stock, given a trade that size, because the order 
submitter  might  know  the  size  of  the  pending  order too,  data we  do not 
possess.@ 
What is at issue here is the interpretation of the results of completed transac- 
tions caused by market orders hitting regular and indicative quotes. We cannot 
hope to learn too much about the demand for immediacy in the form of market 
orders without observing the supply of liquidity in the form of limit 0rders.4~ 
Accordingly,  we confine our attention to unconditional moments that could 
reasonably be measured by investors who had access only to the widely broad- 
cast information contained in our data. Even from this limited perspective, we 
can learn much about the TSE mechanisms. 
41.  Brokerage firms execute trades for large customers on an agency basis, and their traders 
routinely look at the limit order book when proceeding with trade execution. The absence of a 
block trading market means that we  can draw no  firm conclusions about how the TSE might 
function if such a market were introduced. 
42. This is not merely an academic possibility-the  TSE reports that proprietary  trading by 
members firms accounts for 25 percent of all trading. 
43. That is, they act like the limit order traders in Glosten's (1994) electronic limit order book. 
44. Remember that warning and special quote trading halts end with the partial fill of any pend- 
ing orders. Hence, letting Q, denote the size of  the pending order, Q, the size of the order that hit 
the indicative quote, P,  the price of the order that hit the indicative quote, and P, the price at some 
future point, a risk-neutral order submitter would choose Q,  so that P, = E[P,  I Q,,, Q,] f E[P,  I 
Q,].  We might be able to make some progress by assuming that the pending order followed some 
sort of  trading strategy whose properties  we can infer from completed transactions, but such a 
model lies in the domain of future research. 
45. We  will try to obtain limit order data but are not hopeful that the TSE will permit such 
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9.3  The Efficacy of the TSE Market Mechaniqms 
In this section, we first provide an overview of some of the unconditional 
regularities in our data. We then describe our main results-trade  and quote 
behavior before, during, and after multiple price change events, particularly 
those during which warning andor special quotes were issued. 
It is useful to first report  some of the gross characteristics of  our multiple 
price change events from the data. Table 9.2 foreshadows several of the conclu- 
sions that we draw from the more detailed results that follow. Nearly 85 percent 
of  multiple price change events do not result in a trading halt. Of those that 
result in a trading halt, the vast majority end in a trade hitting the warning 
quote. Almost 80 percent of the multiple price change events and almost 90 
percent of  the trading halts take place in  stocks selling below Y1,OOO  (i.e., 
stocks with the small Y1 tick size) even though only two-thirds of  stocks sell 
for less than Yl,000.46  Almost one-third of the multiple price change events 
take place within half an hour of the open of a stock (including delayed opens), 
a large number given that 15 percent to 20 percent of trade volume is typically 
at the open. We are unsurprised by the direction of these effects but find it 
striking that the percentages of  total events in each of  these categories is so 
large. 
To  conclude this brief detour, table 9.3 reports on a distinctive feature of the 
TSE: the division of the trading day into two trading sessions. Roughly a third 
of the multiple price change events in our sample occurred during the first half 
hour after trade in a stock opened. The majority of such events take place after 
the morning open, following the longer period of market c10sure.~’  Delayed 
opens account for about half of these events. 
Call markets trade off the benefits of order consolidation against the costs 
of  fragmented price discovery during the prior period of market closure. As 
Amihud and Mendelson  (1989) have suggested, the long period of  closure 
prior to the morning open (save for overnight trading in foreign markets) gener- 
ates subsequent order imbalances because of the absence of recent price dis- 
covery. However, the afternoon itayose follows the ninety-minute lunch break, 
a call market that benefits from the comparatively recent price discovery during 
the morning session.48  Afternoon order consolidation in a single-price auction 
is followed by low-cost trading (i.e., low bid-ask spreads) because subsequent 
46. We  surmise that this occurs because (I) 81  is a smaller fraction of the price (is., it is a 
smaller friction) and (2) Y10 stocks have greater quote depth because of the greater protection 
from informed traders (i.e., it is a larger friction). 
47. There are 1,287 more multiple price change events following delayed morning opens com- 
pared with delayed afternoon opens. The largest component of this difference is that there are 
1,207 more regular multiple price change events. 
48. Amihud and Mendelson (1989) find evidence of excess volatility in their examination of 
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Table 9.2  How Multiple Price Change Events End 
Regular  Warning Quote Events Ending 
Change  Without a  With a Trading  Special Quote 
Total  Events  Trading Halt  Halt  Trading Halts 
Multiple Price 
All multiple price  876,799  154,582  579,958  139,366  2,893 
change events  100%  17.63%  66.14%  15.89%  0.33% 
Multiple price change  870,208  154,582  579,958  133,135  2,532 
events ending in a  99.25%  17.76%  66.65%  15.30%  0.29% 
trade 
Multiple price change  696,716  100,829  47 1,2  I4  122,121  2,552 
events in stocks  79.46%  14.47%  67.63%  17.53%  0.37% 
selling for <%I ,000 
Multiple price change  282,411  59,084  172,847  49,076  1,404 
events occumng  32.21%  29.92%  61.20%  17.38%  0.50% 
within 30 minutes 




Note: The last three fractions in column  1 are percentages of the total number of events (i.e., 876,799), 
and the last four columns are percentages of the row totals. 
order imbalances are typically more modest.49  Similarly, it is also unsurprising 
that delayed opens precede many of our multiple price change events. 
Before proceeding, note one final idiosyncrasy of our presentation of these 
results: we did not report standard errors or other indicators of the precision of 
the estimates. As is readily apparent, the number of occurrences in each cell is 
so large that the computed standard errors are extremely small. Accordingly, 
we omitted standard errors and will report them only when we think there is 
any ambiguity. 
9.3.1  The State of the Market before Multiple Price Change Events 
The warning and special quote mechanisms were designed to cope with or- 
der imbalances, and so we first describe the state of the market prior to multiple 
price change events. The figures that follow compare volume and order imbal- 
ances in the thirty minutes prior to the event as well as the average size of the 
ten  trades prior to the  event with  unconditional  means for all trades in the 
twenty-six-month sample. We also reverse the question and employ logit mod- 
49. See Lehmann and Modest (1994) for additional evidence on  this point. More definitive 
observations require a model of the motives for trade to explain why demanders of immediacy in 
the morning session don’t  shift their trades to the afternoon to exploit such cost differentials. In- 
formed traders probably would not shift trades in this fashion in a model where private information 
depreciates over time (i.e., becomes public) and does not vary too much over clock time. Table 9.3  How Multiple Price Change Events around the Morning and Afternoon 
Opens End 
Warning Quote Events Ending 
Multiple Price  Without a  With a Trading  Special Quote 
Total  Change Events  Trading Halt  Halt  Trading Halts 
Regular 
Multiple price change 
events occumng 
within 30 minutes 




Multiple price change 
events occumng 
within 30 minutes 
of the morning 
open (excluding 
delayed opens) 
Multiple price change 
events occurring 
within 30 minutes 
of the afternoon 
open (excluding 
delayed opens) 
Multiple price change 
events occurring in 
stocks with 
morning opens 
delayed < 30 
minutes 
Multiple price change 





Multiple price change 
events in stocks 
















59,084  172,847  49,076  1.404 











5 1,374  15,014 
59.3  1 %  17.33% 
36.5 I1  8,973 
64.60%  15.88% 
36,730  11,596 
57.86%  18.27% 
25,115  6,335 
64.5  1 %  16.27% 
23,117  7,158 











Noret The last three fractions in column  1 are percentages of the total number of events (i.e., 876,799), 
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Fig. 9.5  Average volume in yen in the half hour prior to multiple price change 
events 
els to see if  trading halts are more likely in markets with greater prior order 
flow and order flow volatility. 
Figures 9.5-9.7  describe the average state of the market prior to multiple 
price change events. Figure 9.5 presents average yen volume in the thirty prior 
minutes, figure 9.6 shows mean absolute yen order imbalance in the thirty prior 
minutes, and figure 9.7 shows the average size of  the prior ten trades. Each 
figure sorts these variables into ten size decile~.~O  The first row of each picture 
gives the mean value of these variables for all trades in our twenty-six month 
sample. The second, third, and fourth rows give the means for all multiple price 
change events, events that ended without a trading halt, and those that resulted 
in a trading halt, respectively. 
Not surprisingly, traders submitting market orders that initiate multiple price 
change events do so when the market for liquidity in a stock is volatile or, 
put differently, when there is considerable uncertainty about the “equilibrium” 
50. We divided stocks into size deciles only once, at the close of  the last day of trade prior to 
our twenty-six-month sample. We  did not do so periodically  both because it would have been 
sometimes difficult  (because timely data on the number of shares outstanding was in another data 
set) and because we thought that extensive sensitivity checking of the re-sorting procedure would 
have been exceedingly time consuming. We  thought that our approach would sort stocks into 
reasonably homogeneous groups. We also produced figures that sorted on both size and price. The 
magnitudes differed (i.e., there were larger trades and volumes in high-priced stocks), but the 
shape of  the pattern across size deciles was quite similar in these and the other figures, so we 
reported these simpler pictures to conserve space. 295  Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
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Fig. 9.6  Average absolute order imbalance in yen in the half hour prior to 
multiple price change events 
price. Total volume and order imbalance in the half hour prior to these events 
are much larger than the corresponding unconditional means, especially in the 
medium and smaller size deciles. Figure 9.7 suggests that this is an increase in 
the number of trades, since traders tend to submit only slightly larger orders at 
these times. 
In addition, larger volume, order imbalances, and trade sizes typically pre- 
cede events that end in trading halts. This effect is largest in the midrange of 
the size deciles. However, this contrast is not nearly as sharp as that between 
multiple price change events and regular trades. 
We  sharpened the focus on this contrast by fitting a binary logit model to 
predict whether a multiple price change event ends in a trading halt. We report 
results for a logit model below but also fitted normit and gompit models (i.e., 
those  assuming  cumulative  normal  and  Gompertz  distributions  for the  re- 
sponse probabilities, respectively). Fortunately, we found that the standardized 
coefficient estimates for each model were very ~imilar.~'  We estimated these 
models  only  for events  that  took  place  more than  thirty  minutes  after  the 
itayo~e.~~ 
5 I,  For example, the ratios of probit to logit coefficients were very close to the usual empirical 
value of  1.6. We  had planned to employ nonparametric estimators of the response probabilities 
had the logit models failed this robustness check. 
52. We also fit logit and duration models to the subsample of  events following delayed opens 
or in the first half hour after the morning or afternoon open. We do not include them because the 296  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
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Average trade size in yen in the half hour prior to multiple price 
We used the same sets of variables as indicators of the state of  the market 
before the event in all cases.53  We employed the total yen volume of trade in 
each of eight time intervals: each of the first five minutes before the event and 
minutes six through ten, eleven through twenty, and twenty through thirty prior 
to the  We also utilized measures of order imbalance over these same 
eight time intervals. The particular form these variables took was the logarithm 
of the absolute value of the ratio of  signed volume to total volume over the 
relevant interval. Finally, we added eight size/price dummies.55 
paper is already too long. Briefly, the logit models for this subset of  trading halt versus nonhalt 
events have coefficients of  the same sign and similar magnitude, save for some of the order imbal- 
ance coefficients. The logit models for chui kehai versus tokubetsu kehai trading halts generally 
failed to converge. 
53. This list of variables is the one with which we started. We  did some search to see if the 
data overwhelmingly supported more parsimonious models but abandoned the search for fear of 
data mining. 
54. Volume for some time intervals was occasionally zero, particularly for one-minute intervals. 
If a variable was zero, we set its logarithm to zero (recall that volume is on the order of millions 
of  yen per trade). We also ran most models in levels instead of  logs and got very similar results. 
We reported the log models because of their relative scale independence. 
55. We divided stocks into three price categories: under Yl,OOO, Y1,OOO to Y2,000, and over 
Y2,OOO. We divided stocks into three size groups: deciles one through three, four through seven, 
and eight through ten. We obtained nine size/price dummies as the product of  these three price 297  Market Structure and Liquidity on  the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Table 9.4 reports on the model for trading halts versus non-trading  halts 
where an “event” is the occurrence of a trading halt. It provides the logit model 
coefficient estimates, their large sample standard errors, and the marginal sig- 
nificance level of the Wald x2  statistic (i.e., the square of the ratio of the coeffi- 
cient estimate to the large sample standard error). We  also report scaled ver- 
sions of the coefficients to provide clearer indicators of the marginal effects of 
these variables. These marginal effects are given by  the coefficients times the 
ratio of  the average value of  the logistic density to the standard deviation of 
the corresponding explanatory variable.56  We  also report several measures of 
model fit: the rank correlation of the model predictions and outcomes, the raw 
scores for these variables, and a likelihood ratio test for the exclusion of  the 
volume and imbalance variables from the 
Trading halts generated by large market orders appear to be more common 
in two circumstances. First, halts occur more frequently if the large order was 
preceded by a period of relatively large order flow and low order flow volatility. 
The marginal order flow  effects are consistent with the average effects re- 
corded in figures 9.5 through 9.7, but the marginal order imbalance effects 
differ from the unconditional means displayed in the figures. Second, halts are 
more common if order imbalances were a large fraction of volume on relatively 
low volume in the last five minutes before the submission of the large order. 
The conditional and unconditional observations generally accord well with 
a simple intuition: traders have reason to fear the information content of large 
trades, particularly if they are primarily on one side of the market and represent 
a large fraction of  recent volume. The behavior of  traders submitting orders 
that cause trading halts is more difficult to characterize because we  do not 
know from the trading record what fraction of the original order remained after 
the nonhalt portion of the trade was completed. We  return to this issue below. 
Finally, table 9.5 reveals that it is hard to predict whether a warning quote 
trading halt will be converted into a special quote trading halt by the arrival of 
an order on the same side of the market. In part, the estimates, particularly on 
prior volume, are more imprecise as reflected by  the large standard errors: 
there are fewer events in the trading halt subsample, and special quote trading 
and size dummies. We then omitted the dummy for the largest firms selling for below 81,000 SO 
that the remaining eight sizdprice dummies were not collinear with the intercept. We estimated 
some models over finer size/price partitions and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
56. The marginal effect of independent variable i on the probability of a positive outcome in 
event j in the logit model is A(x,’p)( 1 -  A(x,’p)) p, where A(.)  is the cumulative logistic distribu- 
tion function exp{ .}/(  1 + expc}), x,  is the vector of observed independent variables prior to event 
j,  p is the corresponding coefficient vector, and p, is its iIh element. For the logistic distribution, 
hG,’P)(  1  ~  A(x,’P)) is the density evaluated for eventj. We  standardized by  its average value. 
57. An additional perspective on the fit of the model arises from consideration of how well the 
model with just an intercept and sizdprice dummies predicts trading halts. In the comparison of 
predicted probability and observed response, 43.5 percent of the pairs were concordant, 28.8 per- 
cent were discordant, and 27.7 percent were tied. Table 9.4  Logit Analysis for Halt versus Nonhalt Events 
A. Slope Coefficients 
Logarithm of Absolute Scaled Order 
Logarithm of Y Volume  Imbalance 
Standard Error  Coefficieot  Standard Error  Coefficient  Variable for 
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B. Intercept and SizePrice Dummy Variable 
Sizeffrice  Probability of 
Category  Coefficient  Scaled Coefficient  Standard Error  Wald x2 
Intercept  1.408  0.0102  <0.0001 
Size llprice 2  0.764  0.0577  0.0287  <0.0001 
Size llprice 3  0.737  0.0166  0.0903  <O.o001 
Size 2iprice 1  0.092  0.02.51  0.0089  <0.0001 
Size 21price 2  0.890  0.1026  0.0204  <0.0001 
Size 21price 3  0.395  0.03  15  0.0242  <0.0001 
Size 3/price  1  0.378  0.0847  0.0106  <0.0001 
Size 31price 2  1.258  0.1612  0.0212  <0.0001 
Size 3lprice 3  0.642  0.0882  0.0162  <0.0001 
C. Other Statistics 
Observations  ProbabilityResponse Correlation” 
Total  Halt  Nonhalt  Concordant  Discordant  Tied 
737.5 17  116,425  62 1,092  58.0%  40.3%  1.7% 
Rank correlation 0.589 
LRT for model 1,459 -  ~~(25);  p <  0.0001 
”Correlation between predicted probabilities from the model and observed responses in the data Table 9.5  Logit Analysis for Warning versus Special Quote Trading Halts 
A. Slope Coefficients 
Logarithm of Absolute Scaled Order 
Logarithm of Y Volume  Imbalance 
Variable for  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 









































































B. Intercept and SizePrice Dummy Variable 
SizePrice  Probability of 
Category  Coefficient  Scaled Coefficient  Standard Error  Wald  x2 
Intercept 
Size Uprice 2 
Size Uprice 3 
Size 2/price 1 
Size 2/price 2 
Size 2/price 3 
Size 3/price 1 
Size 3/price 2 





































C. Other Statistics 
Observations  ProbabiIityResponse Correlations’ 
Total  Special Ouote  Warnine Ouote  Concordant  Discordant  Tied 
116.425  2.148  114.277  53.6%  36.7%  9.7% 
~~ 
Rank correlation 0.585 
LRT for model 127 -  ~~(25);  p <  O.OOo1 
“Correlation between predicted probabilities from the model and observed responses in the data. 300  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
halts (a “positive” occurrence in this model) are a very small fraction of trading 
halts. Nevertheless,  several coefficients  are significant  at conventional  levels 
and generally suggest somewhat counterintuitively  that special quote trading 
halts are more common when prior volume and order imbalances in the last 
ten minutes were small. We return to this observation again 
9.3.2  Trade and Quote Behavior during Multiple Price Change Events 
We ask three questions of our data regarding trades and quotes during mul- 
tiple price change events. First, do traders submit different-size market orders 
when they generate warning  and special quote trading halts than when they 
generate multiple price change events that result in no stoppage of trade? In 
addition, we measure how long warning and special quote trading halts last, 
both unconditionally and conditionally on the state of the market prior to the 
halt. Finally, we also ask whether trades of comparable size end warning quote 
and special quote trading halts. We answer these questions in turn. 
Figure 9.8 compares the average size of all trades with the average volume 
of trade during nonhalt warning quote events and the nonhalt portion of warn- 
ing quote trading halts. As before, the data are sorted into size deciles. The first 
row gives the mean size of all trades in our twenty-six-month sample, and the 
second, third, and fourth rows display the average volume of trade concluded 
without a trading halt in all multiple price change events, all events that did 
not result in a trading halt, and those that did result in a trading halt, respec- 
tively. As expected, the volume of trade is large for both halt and nonhalt events 
as the market order walks up or down the limit order book. 
Of  substantial economic interest is the role played by the maximum price 
variation in the volume of trade completed in both halt and nonhalt events. The 
average size of trade completed prior to a trading halt is only slightly smaller 
than the mean for nonhalt events. This would appear to be a direct consequence 
of the structure of the TSE warning quote trading mechanism. 
Two features of  the trading mechanism make the equality of  trade size in 
halt and nonhalt events a natural economic outcome. As we have emphasized, 
the maximum price variation sets a bound beyond which trade is halted. Sec- 
ond, an order large enough to generate a trading halt can be canceled at any 
time prior to conversion to a special quote. Hence, market orders large enough 
to cause a trading halt are identical ex ante to those that would not because of 
the possibility  of order cancellation. Traders exposing limit orders inside the 
bounds set by the maximum price variation would naturally take this possibil- 
ity into account and, hence, would place orders equally attractive to those who 
would and those who would not place orders large enough to cause a trading 
58. Once again, we consider the fit of a model with just an intercept and size/price dummies. In 
the comparison of  predicted probability and observed response, 36.5 percent of  the pairs were 
concordant, 26.3 percent were discordant, and 37.2 percent were tied. 301  Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
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2.  All  Multiple Price Change  Events 
3.  Nmhdlt Events 
I.  Halt  iYe"t5 
Fig. 9.8  Average volume in yen during multiple price change events prior to any 
trading halts 
halt. Since liquidity inside the maximum price variation is identical ex ante, it 
should also be identical ex post. 
How long do warning quote trading halts last? Unconditionally,  figure 9.9 
suggests the answer is, not very long. One-third of the warning quote trading 
halts last less than a minute, while almost half last between one and two mi- 
nutes, so that more than 80 percent of warning quote trading halts last less than 
two minutes. The brevity of  these trading halts reflects  success in attracting 
liquidity: 94 percent of the warning quote trading halts lasting less than two 
minutes ended with a trade.59 
Figure 9.10 suggests that the special quote mechanism is subject to long and 
variable lags. Special quote trading halts last longer than warning quote trading 
halts-fewer  than  5  percent  last less than  a minute and nearly  a third  last 
longer  than  fifteen minutes, an outcome one would  expect, given the price 
discovery function of the special quote mechanism. This distinction also shows 
up below in the size of orders that end the two kinds of  trading halts. 
We  are also interested in how long trading halts last as a function of  the 
59. When warning quotes are converted to special quotes by order arrival, the order generally 
arrives early in the warning quote trading halt-56.95  percent anive within the first minute and 
an additional 25.59 percent between the first and  second minute of  the initiation of a warning 
quote trading halt. 302  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
Fig. 9.9  Average duration of warning quote trading halts 
prior state of the market, and thus we fit duration models to our trading halt 
data. As with the logit models, we fit a number of parametric survival models 
under different distributional assumptions: exponential, Weibull, gamma, 10- 
gistic, and lognormal. Once again, the results were reasonably insensitive to 
the  distributional  specification. We  report  the results for the logistic  model 
because this distribution is robust to large residuals, which arise in this applica- 
tion because of long thin tails in the distribution of warning and special quote 
trading halt durations.60 
We chose the same indicators of the prior state of market liquidity as in the 
logit analysis-total  yen volume and yen order imbalance over the same eight 
time intervals. For the case of special quote trading halts, we added one other 
predetermined variable:  the duration of the prior warning quote trading halt. 
We reasoned that there would typically be much uncertainty as to whether the 
order generating the special quote represented transient liquidity demand or a 
transition to a new equilibrium price after a long warning quote trading halt. 
60. Some distributions fit poorly because they could not track the asymmetry of the empirical 
survival distribution. The logistic model fit both this asymmetry and the long right tail reasonably 
well, so we chose not to fit nonparametric models. 303  Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
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Fig. 9.10  Average duration of special quote trading halts 
In the duration analysis of warning quotes, we treated three events as censor- 
ing normal “failures” (i.e., trades hitting the warning quote): conversion from 
a warning quote to a special quote, cancellation of the pending order, and the 
end of the trading session. Technically, it would be more appropriate to use a 
competing risks formulation of  survival analysis to account for these distinct 
possible outcomes.  However, the proportion  of  warning  quote trading  halts 
ending in a trade is so large (93.59 percent) that it seemed sensible to pool the 
three censoring variables into one composite indicator.61  We had no such prob- 
lem with special quote trading halts: 87.52 percent end in a normal “failure” 
(i.e., tradzs hitting the special quote), and the trading session ended almost all 
of the remaining halts (12.24 percent).62 
Table 9.6 reports on the duration of warning quote trading halts as a function 
of prior volume and order imbalances. Warning quote trading halts last longer 
61. Pending-order cancellations total 3.15 percent, conversion of the warning quote to a special 
quote accounts for 2.03 percent, and the end of  the session represents  1.23 percent of  warning 
quote trading halt conclusions. 
62. AS we  noted earlier, order cancellation concluded fewer than 0.25 percent of the special 
quote trading halts in our sample. Table 9.6  Logistic Duration Analysis for Warning Quote Trading Halts 
A. Slope Coefficients 
Logarithm of Absolute Scaled Order 
Logarithm of  Y Volume  Imbalance 
Variable for  Standard Error  Standard Error 
Minute(s)  Coefficient  (x2  probability)  Coefficient  (x2  probability) 
1  -0.0113 
2  -0.0095 
3  -0.0079 
4  -0.0077 
5  -0.0070 
6-1  0  -0.0099 
11-20  -0.0108 
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B. Intercept and SizePrice Dummy Variable 
SizePrice Category  Coefficient  Standard Error  Probability of  Wald x’ 
Intercept 
Size Uprice 2 
Size Uprice 3 
Size 2/price  1 
Size 2/price 2 
Size 2/price 3 
Size 3/price 1 
Size 3/price 2 
Size 3/price 3 
1.7697 
0.1770 

























C. Other Statistics 
Observations  Scale Parameter 
Total  Regular  Censored  Coefficient  Standard Error 
116,424  108,856  7,568  0.67 15  0.0018 
LRT for model 13,151 -  ~~(16);~  <  0.0001 305  Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
when prior order imbalances are a large fraction of volume and prior volume 
is low.  This observation  is intuitively  sensible. Potential  counterparties  to a 
warning quote are inclined to be cautious since the submitter of the pending 
order is willing to risk exposure to the special quote mechanism. The fear of 
the information content of the pending order is likely to be greater when it is 
difficult to discern whether prior trades were information or liquidity moti- 
vated (i.e., small prior volume amid large relative order imbalances). That is, 
warning quote trading halts last longer when prior trades are less informative 
about the underlying “equilibrium” price. 
Table 9.7 reports the corresponding results for the duration of special quote 
trading halts as a function of prior volume and order imbalances. As with the 
logit model for warning quote versus special quote trading halts, the coefficient 
estimates are more imprecise in large part because special quote trading halts 
are so uncommon. Nevertheless, like warning quote trading halts, special quote 
trading halts tend to last longer when prior volume is low and prior order im- 
balances are a large fraction of volume. An additional result is the expected 
one that special quote trading halts tend to last longer following long prior 
warning quote trading halts. We hesitate to interpret these results further in the 
absence of  a model for the response of  traders to the quote-revision process 
built into the tokubetsu kehai mechanism.h3 
Sharper insights arise from the examination of  the size of orders that end 
warning and special quote trading halts, displayed in figure 9.11. Orders that 
hit warning quotes are somewhat larger than regular trades but are dwarfed by 
the trades that hit special quotes. It is hard to provide a precise interpretation 
of this finding because we do not know the size of the orders pending at the 
end of trading halts; we only know that the volume of pending orders was at 
least as large as the trade quantity, but we do not know how much larger it 
might have been. 
A trader who submits an order that generates a trading halt  and leaves it 
pending risks losing control of order execution. If an order arrives on the same 
side of the market, that trader will almost certainly be unable to cancel the 
pending order. Other traders determine whether the pending order will be exe- 
cuted at the warning quote or whether the warning quote will be converted into 
a special quote, permitting continued price discovery. A trader who leaves an 
order pending at the warning quote presumably takes into account both this 
possibility and the possibility that some part of the order will be executed at 
the warning quote. 
Accordingly,  the small size of  trades hitting warning quotes makes some 
economic sense. Warning quote trading halts stop the price discovery process, 
and thus traders hitting warning quotes should choose a trade size reflecting 
63. By contrast, the model of Easley and O’Hara (1992) suggests that traders ought to be more 
confident that pending orders are not motivated by private information when they are pending for 
a long time. This loose reading of their model suggests that this coefficient ought to be negative. Table 9.7  Logistic Duration Analysis for Special Quote Trading Halts 
A. Slope Coefficients 
Logarithm of Absolute Scaled 
Logarithm ofY Volume  Order Imbalance 
Variable for  Standard Error  Standard Error 

























































B. Intercept and SizePrice Dummy Variable 
SizePrice Category  Coefficient  Standard Error  Probability of Wald x2 
Intercept 
Size I/price 2 
Size I/price 3 
Size Z/price  I 
Size 2/price 2 
Size 2/price 3 
Size 3/price 1 
Size 3/price 2 
Size 3/price 3 
16.8071  0.9096 
-0.8036  2.4719 
-  12.7857  10.1927 
-  1.3438  0.6823 
-3.4204  1.6065 
-2.6898  1.9561 
-2.7005  0.8952 
1.9280  1.8532 
-  I .7964  1.5017 










Observations  Warning Quote Trading Halt Duration 
Total  Regular  Censored  Coefficient  Standard Error  Probability 
2,147  1,823  324  0.2457  0.0799  0.0022 
LRT for model 1  15 -  x2(  16);  p < 0.000 1 
Scale parameter 7.1639 
Standard error 0.1435 307  Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 





Event  Type : 
1  All Trades 
2.  ~11  Multiple Price Change Events 
3.  Nonhalt Event5 
4.  Halt Events 
Fig. 9.11  Average size of trades in yen that end warning and special quote 
trading halts 
their valuation of the stock, given the pending-order submitter’s willingness to 
risk conversion to a special quote. This order size would tend to be decreasing 
in the size of the pending order. If the large size of orders ending special quotes 
is a reliable guide to the size of pending orders at warning quotes (an eventual- 
ity that we can only verify by  studying the limit order book), traders hitting 
warning quotes would tend to submit small orders. 
On this view, the large trades ending special quotes reflect the marginal deci- 
sions of traders who risk the price discovery process inherent in the special 
quote mechanism. Such traders lose control over the order and, in particular, 
the prices at which their orders will be executed. Moreover, traders initiating 
special quotes by joining pending orders choose to lose control over execution 
price. Hence, such traders are likely to be uninformed, and the confidence of 
potential counterparties is increasing in the size of the pending order. An unin- 
formed trader submitting a large order in this fashion will tend to pay a smaller 
adverse selection cost as a consequence. Put differently, this evidence is con- 
sistent with the pending orders during special quotes being somewhat like sun- 
shine trades. 
9.3.3  The State of the Market after Multiple Price Change Events 
Figures 9.12-9.14  describe the average state of the market following mul- 
tiple price change events. Figure 9.12 presents average yen volume in the sub- 







1.  A11 Trade3 
2.  ~11  Multiple ?=ice Change Events 
3.  Nonhalt Events 




Fig. 9.12  Average volume in yen in the half hour following multiple price 
change events 







1.  All-Trades 
2. 
3.  Nonhalt Events 
4.  Halt Events 
~ll  Multiple ?rice Change Event3 
Fig. 9.13 
multiple price change events 
Average absolute order imbalance in yen in the half hour following 309  Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
x  YlOOO  Event  Type: 
1.  All Trades 
2.  ~ll  uultiple price Change went3 
4.  nait Event3 
12,000 1  3.  Nonhalt  Events 
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10.000 




Fig. 9.14  Average yen trade size in yen in the half hour following multiple price 
change events 
for the same period, and figure 9.14 shows the average size of the subsequent 
ten trades. As before, each figure sorts these variables into ten size deciles. The 
first row of each picture gives the mean value of these variables for all trades 
in our twenty-six-month  sample. The second, third, and fourth rows give the 
means for all multiple price change events, all events that ended with no stop- 
page of trade, and those that did result in a trading halt, respectively. 
These figures look remarkably similar to the corresponding pictures describ- 
ing the prior state of the market (i.e., figures 9.5-9.7).  Multiple price change 
events take place during periods of  volatility in the market for liquidity in a 
stock. As before, total volume and order imbalance in the thirty minutes fol- 
lowing these events are substantially larger than the corresponding uncondi- 
tional means, especially in the medium and smaller size deciles. Figure 9.12 
suggests that this is an increase in the number of trades, since traders tend to 
submit only slightly larger orders at these times. These effects are somewhat 
larger for events that resulted in trading halts, but the magnitude of this effect 
is small. 
9.4  Conclusion 
We have established several facts in these pages. Investors seldom trip the 
trading halt mechanisms of the TSE, and, when they do, they usually execute 
all or part of  their pending order at the warning quote, a price they know in 310  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
advance. Traders are more likely to trigger indicative quote dissemination and 
temporary trading halts when the market for liquidity is relatively volatile, par- 
ticularly around the morning open and after delayed opens. The volume of 
trading during nonhalt events is very similar to that during events that result in 
trading halts, a result that accords with similar economic intuition. Similarly, 
the trades that end warning quote trading halts are generally much smaller than 
those that end special quote trading halts, a result that is also intuitively plau- 
sible. What is perhaps surprising is not that these results accord with intuition, 
but rather that they conform to it so well. 
Unfortunately, we can say little from a policy perspective. Order-placement 
strategies and the demand and supply of liquidity are surely endogenous to the 
trading mechanism. We simply cannot tell if these mechanisms perform as they 
do because they fulfill their intended roles or because investors have learned to 
put up with their idiosyncrasies. We can draw one firm  conclusion-the  TSE 
is a large market whose mechanisms rarely result in the interruption of trade. 
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COmment  Kazuhisa Okamoto 
The TSE implicitly assumes that numerous incoming orders in small lots are 
all scattered on the limit order book. This assumption is probably related to 
the fact that this mechanism was established in  1949, when about 70 percent 
of outstanding shares were owned by individual investors and only 10  percent 
and 5 percent were owned by financial institutions and corporations, respec- 
tively. 
Current  shareholder distribution  looks very different; namely, individuals 
own only 24 percent, financial institutions own 41 percent, and corporations 
own 24 percent of outstanding shares. The 46 percent reduction in the share 
of individuals was absorbed by a combined increase in the share of financial 
institutions and corporations. In other words, mutual cross-holding of  stocks 
among corporations and financial institutions has taken over holdings of indi- 
viduals over the last forty-four years. 
During this period, buying and selling by  investors have been orchestrated 
by large securities companies. Individuals bought and sold based on brokers’ 
recommendations. Investment trusts were generally owned by securities firms. 
With respect to cross-holdings, buyers  and sellers agreed on the transaction 
in advance, and securities firms belonging to the same zaibatsu group crossed 
the transaction on the exchange. In the second half of the  1980s, there was a 
“bubble market” in which corporations and financial institutions traded stocks 
for realized  profits with  a very  short-term  investment horizon.  Once again, 
large securities firms led the market, picking low-priced, large-capitalization 
issues for dealing purposes. 
Until very recently, brokerage companies were the conductor of the market 
orchestra. Now that the bubble has burst, the market leaders are changing from 
cross-holdings and zaitech speculations to pension funds. The size of Japanese 
pension  funds, which is already $1.6 trillion, is likely to double in the next 
ten years. Until only four years ago, the industry had been monopolized by 
commingled funds of life insurance companies and trust banks, and the assets 
were often used for cross-holding of friendly corporations. Investment  advi- 
sory companies  have been deregulated to manage pension  funds only since 
1990, but their proportion  to the total is still a mere 2 percent. I think this is 
likely to change. 
As market  leaders change, characteristics  of the need for liquidity  in the 
market  are likely  to change. Previously,  cross-holders  looked  for a total  of 
investment returns and business returns, with more emphasis on the latter. Indi- 
viduals tend to look at individual stocks and not at a portfolio. Zaitech specula- 
tors aimed at realizing gains in a year to boost operating earnings. Pension 
funds, of course, are different. They assume a longer investment horizon, con- 
Kazuhisa  Okamoto is managing  director in charge of  Japan/Asia operations of Wells Fargo 
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sider risks  and  returns,  and  seek  diversification. They  regard  “investment 
value” to be the most important criteria for stock selection. With these changes 
evolving now, the question is, Is the current market mechanism good enough 
to support new liquidity needs? 
I would like to point out a couple of barriers that institutional investors like 
ourselves are facing day to day. First of  all, in Japan, all trades have to occur 
on the floor-there  are no OTC crossings, no crossing networks, no upstairs, 
no internal crossings, and so forth. All trades are basically monopolized by 
the exchange. Second, important trade information is available only to stock 
exchange members and not to investors. Limit order book situation is available 
only at the headquarters of member brokers. Even while using the same Quick 
price-quotation systems, terminals at brokerage offices have ask and bid quotes 
but not the terminal at investors’ offices. Exchange members are monopolizing 
important trade information. 
It is very difficult to get a membership on the stock exchange in Japan. Only 
securities companies, not individuals, are qualified to be a member, and corpo- 
rations must have a license from the Ministry of Finance to be a broker. The 
fact that the seat is so expensive is a good indication that there are some excess 
profits to be gained on the floor. Brokers often use monopolized information 
of the market to solicit orders from institutional investors. Whoever provides 
the most such information the fastest will get the deal. It can be considered as 
a tool to support fixed commissions. 
These social costs reduce investment returns. Until recently, cross-holders, 
a dominant power in the market, did not consider investment return to be the 
most important criteria. Now, as pension funds gain importance in the market, 
investment return becomes significant. I think it is natural to assume that a 
mechanism closer to that of  the United States will be developed as demand 
mounts. How fast may be a question, since the existing powers, who have been 
benefiting from the old regime, will try to slow the process as much as possible. 
However, it is impossible to stop or reverse the trend for rationality. Sooner or 
later, a “soft bang” is due. Furthermore, having such a rational trading mecha- 
nism, which functions better in the institutionalized market, is a prerequisite 
for a truly strong recovery of the Japanese stock market. 
Authors’ Reply 
As we noted at several points in the paper, we measured the performance of 
the warning and special quote mechanisms of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, tak- 
ing the order-placement strategies of  investors as given. We  realized that we 
could not measure the interaction between the trading mechanism and struc- 
tural characteristics of both the demand for liquidity in the form of market 313  Market Structure and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
orders and the supply of liquidity in the form of limit orders without consider- 
ably more information than that contained in the trade and quote record. We 
remained content to report reduced-form regularities. 
As is commonplace, Kazuhisa Okamoto, along with Pete Kyle in his oral 
remarks at the conference, wished we had written a different paper. Okamoto 
asked, “What changes in the restrictions on investor access both to the trading 
mechanism and to information like the limit order book are appropriate in the 
new market for liquidity in common stocks on the TSE arising from the growth 
of institutional investors like pension funds?’  Kyle asked, “What interests are 
served by the existing market structure?” 
Both discussants arrived at related conclusions-the  existing market struc- 
ture serves the brokerage industry well by maintaining a profitable cartel, but 
future changes in the structure of the TSE are likely to parallel those that oc- 
curred in the United States during the last two decades, resulting in spatial 
fragmentation of  the Japanese equity market. Both discussants thought that 
such changes were desirable, as they would reduce both the price of immediacy 
and the cost of equity capital. 
We thought we would take this opportunity to speculate about these issues, 
to write, as it were, part of the introduction to the paper we did not prepare for 
this conference. In so doing, we find it useful to make distinctions that are 
somewhat different from those drawn by the discussants. In particular, we ask 
three related questions: how would the market for liquidity on the TSE change 
1. if  brokerage commissions were deregulated (as was done in the “May 
day” reform in the United States in 1975), leaving the remainder of the TSE 
structure intact? 
2.  if, in addition, investors were given direct access to the limit order books 
of the TSE both by becoming exchange members and through an analog of the 
DOT and SuperDOT systems of the NYSE (again leaving the remainder of the 
TSE structure intact)? and 
3.  if, in addition, the Ministry of Finance permitted widespread spatial frag- 
mentation to arise in the form of  separate markets for large and small orders 
(like the upstairs market on the NYSE), of third-market-style competition by 
the regional exchanges with the TSE, and of the establishment of fourth-market 
venues like crossing networks? 
We address each of these questions in turn. 
The answer to the first question seems surprisingly simple: from the per- 
spective of institutional investors like pension funds, the answer is, not much. 
The commission structure already makes large orders substantially less expen- 
sive than  small orders, and brokers already engage in widespread  nonprice 
competition by aggressively “working” large orders. Brokers engage in propri- 
etary trading in ways that give t‘le orders of large customers favorable exposure 
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of commission deregulation by itself. It is likely that institutional investor costs 
would fall substantially only if the other large explicit trading cost, the stamp 
tax on transactions, were reduced for nonbroker trades.' 
The second question is considerably more complicated. In this hypothetical 
environment, the TSE would become a set of consolidated public limit order 
books. Market participants who incurred the costs of direct participation could 
then compete in the production of low-cost liquidity, since there would be open 
and equal access to market making.2  This market structure would resemble the 
open electronic limit order books studied in Glosten (1994) and might well 
have the twin virtues they possessed in his model-they  represent the lowest- 
cost  market  structures  that  remain  viable  in  the  face of  differentially  in- 
formed traders. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to think that large investors like pension funds 
would not reap substantial benefits from a thoroughgoing change along these 
lines.3  In such an environment, large passively managed pools like index funds 
and the passive portion of pension funds typically reduce the price of immedi- 
acy through securities lending and patient trading. However, the current system 
has a substitute for these low-cost suppliers of liquidity: proprietary trading by 
member firms on the TSE. Proprietary traders at the head offices of member 
firms have approximately open and equal access to the information in the limit 
order book. The price paid to finance proprietary trading by member firms is 
roughly  equal to the rep0 rate, the marginal price that would be charged in 
securities lending. We certainly cannot tell if  member firms supply the same 
quantity of liquidity services at these prices as would be supplied by potential 
market participants in a future consolidated public limit order book environ- 
ment, but this observation is surely suggestive. 
In fact, proprietary trading by member firms accounts for 25 percent of trad- 
ing on the TSE, suggesting the supply of liquidity services to large customers 
might well be substantial to the extent that member firms do not simply front- 
run their customers. Member firms appear to do the opposite on the TSE- 
traders place orders that clear out existing  orders ahead of  their customer's 
order in the limit order book in order to make the customer order the best bid 
or offer. If the supply of Proprietary trading for these purposes is sufficiently 
elastic at the present time,  institutional customers would probably  see only 
modest changes in trading costs following such a reform. Put differently, it is 
far from obvious that brokers in the current market system break up orders and 
I. Currently, securities companies pay a transaction tax of 0.12 percent while all other traders 
pay 0.30 percent. 
2. Different investors would still confront different costs, if only in the differcntial stamp-tax 
levy referred to above. 
3. Institutional investors would probably place some different trades in the new environment 
because they would then have direct access to the same trade information as brokers currently 
receive. In the present environment, investors can get information like the current best bid and 
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work  trades  any  differently  from the  ways  in  which  the  customers  would 
choose to do so if they had direct access to the limit order books on the TSE.4 
At this time, the only clear answer to the third question is that it is hard to 
tell. That is, the jury is still out on the costs and benefits of spatial fragmenta- 
tion in American and European secondary markets. Widespread  spatial frag- 
mentation reduces costs for some traders and increases costs for others in both 
direct and indirect waysJ For example, index funds like those run by Okamoto 
at Wells Fargo Nikko Investment Advisors would probably experience a sub- 
stantial reduction in trading costs as they would exploit opportunities to trade 
both in different venues and differently in existing trading venues as identifi- 
able informationless traders. Small traders would probably benefit as well for 
similar reasons. 
By contrast, informed traders might well experience increased price impact 
costs to the extent that some uninformed traders can credibly identify them- 
selves and trade in separate markets. The associated reduction in the incentive 
to acquire and trade on private information might well diminish the equilib- 
rium efficiency of  the price discovery process. Strategies to reduce the price 
impact of large block trades, such as the delay of  last-sale reporting on SEAQ 
International, also lessen the short-run efficiency of  the price discovery pro- 
cess. That is, consolidation of  orders on one trading venue with widespread 
broadcasts of  trading opportunities and ex post transparency in the form of 
immediate last-sale reporting clearly has some benefits, too. 
Since we cannot predict the consequences of possible spatial fragmentation 
in Japanese markets, we consider the implications of  the first two scenarios 
outlined above for the conclusions we drew in the paper. That is, suppose that 
the Ministry of Finance allowed both the initiation of the free commission era 
and widespread public access to the limit order books of the TSE. How would 
the  chui  and  tokubetsu  kehai  mechanisms  perform  under  this  new  market 
structure? 
It is likely that all of  our main conclusions would survive such substantial 
reforms. Brokers already aggressively work institutional orders in the existing 
environment, and institutional investors would probably find it optimal to fol- 
low  similar order-placement  strategies after the  reforms. Accordingly,  it  is 
likely that the warning and special quote mechanisms would be tripped infre- 
quently by traders in the new environment and, when tripped, that the mecha- 
nisms would usually result in temporary trading haltsS6  In the new environ- 
4.  That is, existing member firms may already compete away most of the rents associated with 
restrictions on free entry into the market-making business. To  be sure, the price of  seats on the 
TSE is sufficiently high as to suggest that not all rents are competed away. 
5. Another distinction between fragmented and consolidated markets is the elimination of time 
priority for limit orders across markets. 
6.  Similarly, the order-placement strategies followed by institutional investors in the new market 
environment would probably have most of the same characteristics as those documented in figures 
9.5-9.14  and tables 9.2-9.7.  Parenthetically, changing the tick size of stocks that sell for more 316  Bruce N. Lehmann and David M. Modest 
ment,  orders  from the  broader  investor  public  would  still bridge  temporal 
fluctuations in the demand for liquidity services much as they do on the TSE 
at present. That is, these mechanisms would still serve their intended purpose 
of organizing liquidity in the presence of the temporal fragmentation of order 
flow. 
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